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A NOTE ON INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN 
BRITISH COLUMBIA'S 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Joseph B. ROSE 
Since the publication of the Goldenberg inquiry into construction 
labour relations in Ontario (1962), the industrial relations system in 
construction has corne under increasing scrutiny. l Studies by Golden-
berg and Crispo2, Woods3 and Rose4 hâve explored such topics as 
the structure, performance and issues of collective bargaining, the 
certification process, and the accréditation of contractor associations. 
J. B. Rose, Assistant Professor, School of Administration, University of New 
Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B. 
1
 Report of the Royal Commission on Labour-Management Relations in the 
Construction Industry, H. Cari Goldenberg, Commissioner, Ontario, 1962. 
2
 H. Cari GOLDENBERG and John H. G. CRISPO, eds., Construction Labour 
Relations, Ottawa, Canadian Construction Association, 1968. 
3
 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Relations in the Nova 
Scotia Construction Industry, H. D. Woods, Commissioner, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
Department of Labour, 1970. 
4
 Joseph B. ROSE, Report on Accréditation and the Construction Industry, 
Fredericton, New Brunswick Department of Labour, 1972. 
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Recently, a new study was published, which examines labour-
management relations in British Columbia's construction industry.5 The 
inquiry was commissioned because oi the growing concern over the 
disruptive effects of industrial strife on the province's econoimy. The 
major purpose of the study was to examine ways of stabilizing con-
struction labour relations and improving the climate for industrial 
peace. The commission's terms of référence included studying: (1) 
ways of improving bargaining structure and reforming accréditation 
législation; (2) the problems of organizing employées; and (3) the 
impact of national agreements on collective bargaining in the province. 
The présent commentary reviews two of the major components 
of the study. The first section explores the methodological problems 
involved in analyzing such concepts as countervailing power and 
accréditation in terms of statistical measures of industrial conflict. 
This is followed by an assessment of the Report's recommendations 
for improving bargaining structure in B. C.'s construction industry. 
COUNTERVAILING POWER, ACCREDITATION AND STRIKES 
The Report attempts to give some indication of «the extent of 
countervailing power in employer-employée relations» by examining 
strike and lockout statistics between 1956 and 1974. The data shows that 
241,686 man-days were lost between 1954 and 1969, a mère one-tenth 
of the man-days lost between 1970 and 1974 (2,551,714 man-days 
lost).6 Unquestionably the 1970's hâve been marked by bitter labour 
strife, but do thèse events logically produce the following conclusion? 
A review of the man-days of work delayed over the period 1956 and 
including 1969, seems to compel one to conclude that labour relations 
in the construction industry, up until the accréditation of CLRA were 
relatively good. At the very least, it can be said that the many years 
from 1956 to 1970 that were effectively free of work stoppages do not 
seem to indicate some sort of bargaining imbalance.7 
The Report goes on to compare the time lost due to strikes 
and lockouts in Ontario and British Columbia by noting: 
In terms of strikes and lockouts, this Province possesses a much more 
unsatisfactory record of time-loss than Ontario. Ontario has an organized 
construction labour force that is over twice the size of this Province's 
and yet has experienced only a total of 2,129,759 man-days of work 
delayed in the period 1970 to 1974 in contrast to the comparable EJ.C. 
figure of 2,584,271 man-days. A primary reason is the existance of rela-
tively smaller accredited bargaining units in Ontario.8 
5
 First Report, Spécial Commission of Inquiry into British Columbia Con-
struction, James Kinnaird, Commissioner, Victoria, B .C . Department of Labour, 1975. 
6
 IbicL, p. 42. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid., p. 43. 
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Thèse conclusions do not stand up under scrutiny. Among the 
most notable shortcomings of the Report's analysis of labour-manage-
ment relations, are: (1) the presumed linear relationship between an 
imbalance in bargaining power and industrial strife; (2) the failure to 
understand, accurately report and evaluate the effect of accréditation 
on industrial conflict; and (3) the failure to make meaningful compar-
isons of strike data in Ontario and British Columbia. Let us turn to 
a brief critique of each of thèse areas. 
(1) The question of whether an imbalance in collective bargaining 
exists can not simply be measured by examining strike and lockout 
statistics. Most observers believe the building trades hold the balance of 
power in the construction industry. Foster and Strauss characterize 
the unions' advantage as follows : 
In the first place, most contractor associations are composed of large 
numbers of small, undercapitalized employers. Prolongée work stoppages 
may threaten thèse firms' solvency. Thus pressure builds from within the 
association to meet the union's demands, particularly since each employer 
knows that his compétition will hâve to operate under the same conditions. 
A second important factor is the localized nature of most bargaining 
relationships. In this situation many union members are frequently able to 
find work in nearby jurisdictions, thus mitigating the économie pressure 
on the union to scale down its demands.9 
Measuring bargaining power must, therefore, consider the costs of 
agreeing vs. the costs of disagreeing. For contractors, the threat of a 
strike or an actual strike during peak construction periods can impose 
a substantial cost of disagreeing. It is not uncommon for contractors 
to buy labour peace rather than face a work stoppage, and pass on the 
added costs to the purchasers of construction. It is noteworthy that 
despite the labour tranquility of the i960's, construction workers in 
B.C. improved their relative wage position vis-a-vis workers in other 
industries, e.g., manufacturing (see Table 1). Similar results hâve been 
reported in the United States.10 Thèse findings suggest that strike 
proneness may be but one symptom of an imbalance of power; dis-
proportionate wage increases would appear to be another. 
(2) The Report erroneously conveys the impression that the 
process of accréditation and increased industrial strife are linked. In 
actual point of fact, the lengthy work stoppage of 1970 (925,000 man-
days lost) preceded the accréditation of CLRA. (CLRA was accredited 
on July 14, 1970, twelve weeks after the work stoppage began). Further-
more, a careful examination of the voluntary nature of accréditation 
législation in B.C. casts doubt as to whether it has exerted an inde-
pendent influence on labour-management conflict. Indeed, accréditation 
9
 Howard G. FOSTER and George STRAUSS, «Labor Problems in Con-
struction: A Review», Industrial Relations, XI, October, 1972, p. 310. 
10
 Howard G. FOSTER, « Wages in Construction: Examining the Arguments», 
Industrial Relations, XI, October, 1972, pp. 336-349. 
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TABLE 1 
Hourly Earnings in Construction as a Percent 
of Manufacturing in British Columbia, 1960-1970 
Construction As 
A Percentage Of 
Y car Construction Manufacturing Manufacturing 
i960 $2.74 $2.18 125.7 
1961 2.76 2.23 123.8 
1962 2.83 2.28 124.1 
1963 2.95 2.36 125.0 
1964 3.17 2.47 126.3 
I965 3.47 2.62 132.4 
1966 3.98 2.78 143.2 
1967 4.30 3.01 142.9 
1968 4.33 • 3.23 134.1 
1969 5.01 3.48 144.0 
1970 5.48 3.71 147.1 
SOURCE: DBS Publication 72-202, Annual Review of Man-Hours and Hourly Earnings 
does little more than give CLRA in law what it achieved on a voluntary 
basis in 1969. 
The increase in labour unrest in the post-CLRA period resulted 
from many factors. Efforts by CLRA to coordinate and centralize 
bargaining met stiff résistance from the unions. In 1970, some unions 
were opposed to voluntarily recognizing CLRA as the contractors' 
bargaining agent. The lockouts imposed by CLRA in 1970 and 1972, 
which were in response to the divide-and-conquer tactics of the 
unions, produced further bitterness. Government attempts to résolve 
thèse disputes, including the imposition of compulsory arbitration, 
only antagonized the building trades and prolonged the work stoppages. 
Finally, in 1974, the initiation of joint bargaining by ten trades produced 
another impasse. 
The Report considers many of thèse underlying causes of labour 
unrest, but fails to perceive the interrelationship of thèse events. The 
structure of collective bargaining has been dramatically transformed in 
the past Ave years. Since its création, CLRA has been committed to 
more centralized collective bargaining. The turmoil which has been 
experienced in the 1970's appears to be a response to CLRA rather 
than accréditation. Theoretically accréditation was designed to give 
employers countervailing power, but in practice its effect has been only 
minimal. This is because accréditation does not give CLRA control 
over unionized contractors who hâve chosen to remain outside the 
organization. CLRA amply demonstrated its bargaining power as an 
unaccredited association in 1970, when it employed a three-month 
lockout of the building trades. 
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(3) The comparison of time lost due to strikes and lockouts in 
Ontario and B.C. is misleading in two respects. Firstly, the period 
1970-1974 is not an appropriate time span for comparison. During this 
period there were three major rounds of negotiations in B.C. (1970, 
1972 and 1974), whereas in Ontario, there were only two. In 1975, Onta-
rio's construction industry had to re-negotiate more than 325 collective 
agreements. Although offical strikes statistics for 1975 hâve not as yet 
been published, newspaper accounts of the Ontario negotiations indi-
cated there was an upsurge in labour strife. n 
A second problem with the analysis is that there is no basis for 
concluding that smaller accréditation units in Ontario account for differ-
entials in industrial conflict. Expérience with accréditation is extremely 
limited in Ontario. As of December 31, 1973, the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board had issued 21 accréditation orders for 13 contractor 
associations (3 in 1971, 5 in 1972 and 13 in 1973). Consequently, most 
of thèse contractor associations hâve either never bargained or hâve 
bargained only once as an accredited body between 1970 and 1974. In 
addition, the number of accréditation orders issued during this period 
cover only a small proportion of the potential bargaining units in the 
province (predominantly among mechanical contractors). 
Even if we overlook thèse shortcomings, what can be derived from 
such a comparison of strike statistics ? Are we to assume that aggregate 
measures of man-days lost are an accurate reflection of the économie 
impact of strikes? In Ontario, where bargaining structure is more 
decentralized, a strike by one trade can shut down ail unionized con-
struction in a particular locality, e.g., metropolitan Toronto. Regardless 
of how long a dispute continues, the total number of workers on strike 
and man-days lost could be insignificant in comparison to the time lost 
by construction workers refusing to cross picket Unes. In conclusion, 
the Report's analysis of interprovincial strike data is incomplète on 
two scores: it fails to consider the significance of such factors as the 
ripple effect of industrial conflict and its inferences about accréditation 
can not be substantiated. 
IMPROVING BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
Despite some of the Report's conclusions about accréditation, it 
strongly endorses centralized collective bargaining in construction, even 
if it requires législative action. The building trades would be required 
to recognize construction as an integrated industry, in which common 
objectives must be coordinated in the public interest. To achieve 
this end, it was recommended that individual building trades be required 
to: (1) establish a provincial council of its local unions; (2) join the 
British Columbia and Yukon Territory Building and Construction 
trades Council ; (3) conduct its collective bargaining through the Council. 
11
 «A Long Summer of Labor Discontent: 193 Strikes Involving 40,000 Work-
ers», Globe and Mail, July 10, 1975, pp. I, 2. 
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If the unions are not prepared to do this voluntarily, the Report rec-
ommends that it be made compulsory. It further recommends that 
the Council be formally recognized in law as the umbrella organization 
representing construction unions. 
On the employer side, it was suggested that trade association 
bargaining be pursued with CLRA acting in the same capacity as the 
Provincial Building Trades Council. This could be achieved within the 
existing organizational structure of CLRA. The Report recognizes that 
CLRA has demonstrated «industrial relations maturity» and that there 
is no need to revise accredititation législation. Although multi-trade 
bargaining is not ruled out, the Report strongly endorses trade-by-trade 
bargaining at the provincial level as the best means for resolving trade 
issues and promoting harmonious labour relations. Thèse proposais are 
remarkably similar to those advanced by the Construction Labour 
Relations Association of Ontario in a récent brief to the Ontario 
government.12 
Certainly there is room to debate whether thèse recommendations 
are more advantageous than province-wide, multi-trade bargaining. 
Thèse arguments aside, the Report's proposais do provide a basis for 
improving labour-management relations. They consistently stress the 
need for unions to view labour relations from a more integrated per-
spective and strongly discourage independent action. Besides requiring 
individual unions to bargain through the Provincial Building Traders 
Council, the Report proposes that unions wishing to «go it alone» be 
prohibited by law from picketing integrated work sets. The poor record 
of labour unrest in the 1970's may prove to be the only incentive 
the parties need to adjust to thèse proposed législative and organi-
zational changes. If not, the growing challenge of right-to-work and 
own-account construction along with need to protect the interests of 
the public and clients, should stimulate a more coopérative labour 
relations environment. 
CONCLUSION 
I am of two minds about this Report. Although the Commission 
has done a crédible job of collecting data, the analysis of this material 
is plagued by numerous shortcomings. What is most disturbing is the 
failure of the Report to fully appreciate the complexities of assessing 
the impact of accréditation législation on the construction industrial 
relations System. The proposition that increases in industrial conflict 
are associated with accréditation remains unproven. Even if we accept-
ed this proposition, it is unclear why the Commission failed to rec-
ommend that accréditation be repealed. 
12
 Wilfred LIST. « Province-Wide Bargaining Sought by CLRA in Brief to 
Commission», Globe and Mail, February 10, 1976, p. B2. 
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Finally, it is quite surprising that a study characterized by thèse 
and other methodological limitations can produce such intriguing, and 
indeed, crédible recommendations for improving construction labour 
relations. It will be interesting to observe whether labour, management 
and the government will be able to transform thèse proposais into 
a course of action. 
FULL EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES: 
A EUROPEAN LESSON? 
Klaus WEIERMAIR 
Most industrialized European countries hâve, over the past 
décade, shown an appreciably better performance of their labour 
markets than the U.S. or Canada when measured in such terms as 
rates of unemployment. Even at times of recession such as prevailing 
at the présent, the unemployment rates on an annual basis rarely 
climb over 3-4%. At the same time, many of thèse countries, but notably 
Sweden and West-Germany, hâve experienced almost an explosion of 
social reforms and labour market interventions of one kind or another, 
which orthodox economists in this country would condemn as socialist, 
inflationary and of questionable impact to the efficient opération of 
labour markets. 
It is difficult, if not even impossible, to exactly evaluate and 
compare the efficiency and efficacy of labour market policies across 
such countries as the U.S., Canada, Sweden or West-Germany due to 
the inhérent différences in production and labour market conditions, 
différent patterns of growth and international trade. Nevertheless, it is 
possible and certainly useful to describe and analyze basic philosophical 
différences of labour market policies with respect to the development 
and adjustment of manpower in a complex and dynamically changing 
économie environment. 
The problem of the right philosophy or if you want the right policy 
for interventions in the labour market is predetermined by the way 
in which one perceives of and analyzes such problems. Before discuss-
ing what Europeans undertake to bring their labour markets into order, 
let me, therefore, postulate and explain why labour markets may not 
function properly in advanced économies, in the first place. 
— Modem économies are dominated by large structural changes which 
hâve such an enormous repercussion on labour markets that inter-
ventions will become necessary sooner or later. 
* K. Weiermair Associate Professor, Faculty of Administrative Studies, York 
University, presently on leave with the International Institute of Management West-
Berlin, Germany. 
